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Soon after President Gamal Abdel-Nasser’s rise to power in 1953, Egypt, a relatively 
uneducated country with a low literacy rate, became the largest exporter of education throughout 
the Middle East. The post-colonial environment of the Arab world called for a new power 
balance, and Egypt had begun exercising its soft power influence in the region. This thesis 
explores the growth and development of Egyptian education in the fifties and sixties. It deals 
with the intersection of ideology, governing philosophy, and education.  
The first chapter observes Egypt’s domestic system of education following the 1952 
Revolution. It portrays the role of the state in defining and enforcing the Egyptian citizen’s 
experience through tools of knowledge production, drawing on a variety of Arabic-language 
archival sources. The second chapter explores the exportation of this experience to the far 
reaches of the Arab world – the Eastern Arabian Gulf. It follows the politicized appointments of 
Egyptian teachers to Kuwait, the Trucial States, Qatar, and Bahrain. And it argues that, partially 
due to these teachers, Egyptian Arab nationalism pervaded the political atmosphere of the 
twentieth century Gulf. 
This thesis addresses the inner workings of the Egyptian classroom during the fifties and 
sixties, tracing wider trends in Egyptian statecraft through the educational establishment. It 
unpacks the intellectual implications of Egypt’s ideologically-pointed educational plan, arguing 
that the revolutionary government used modes of knowledge production to project the state’s 
consciousness onto the mindset of the Egyptian citizen. It also displays the expansionist telos of 
this consciousness, following the trend of teachers exported as political state-builders throughout 
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Image 2: Sheikh Rashid bin Sa’iid (second Prime Minister of the UAE) with his son Sheikh 
Maktoum bin Rashid visiting President Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1959. From Tariikh al-Ta’liim fiy 
Dubayy by Arif Al-Sheikh, 2004. ……………………..………………………………..…….... 39 
 
 
Image 3: President Gamal Abdel Nasser presents Sheikh Rashid bin Saeed Al Maktoum, Vice 
President of the United Arab Emirates, with the Order of the Nile, Egypt’s highest state honor. 
From Tariikh al-Ta’liim fiy Dubayy by Arif Al-Sheikh, 2004. ……………………………..…. 41 
 
 
Image 4: The commissioning of the first ambassador of the state of Kuwait to the UAR, Mr. 
‘Abd al-’Aziz Hussein. From Kuwait History Archives, 1961. ……………………….…….… 42 
 
 
Image 5: Uprising of students at the Qasimiyya schools throughout the Suez Crisis on Egypt in 
1956. From Tatawwur al-Ta’liim fiy al-Emarat al-‘Arabiyya al-Mutahida, 1904-1971 by 
Muhammad Hassan Al-Harbi, 2017. ……………………………………………….……….…. 57 
 
 
Image 6: A telegram containing Bernard Burrows’ observations on the political activity of 
teachers in Kuwait and the Trucial Coast. From “School teachers for Persian Gulf,” FO 






It has been a joy to participate in the History Honors Program at the University of Texas, 
which has given me a platform to begin engaging in serious historical inquiry. I want to thank 
Dr. Denise Spellberg, Honors Director, for introducing the cohort to the world of academic 
research.  
I would like to thank my thesis advisor, Dr. Yoav Di-Capua, whose classes and books 
piqued my interest in intellectual history and the modern Middle East. His insights and guidance 
were invaluable at every stage of this project. I also must express appreciation for several 
teachers: Dr. Mahmoud Al-Batal, Dr. Samy Ayoub, Dr. Kristen Brustad, Ghada Housen, Dr. 
Rana Inboden, Dr. William Inboden, Dr. Mohammad Mohammad, and Anousha Shahsavari. 
Each one of these professors has contributed profoundly to my intellectual pursuits and shaped 
my experience at the University of Texas.   
I am indebted to the support of the Plan II Honors Program and the Undergraduate 
Research Fellowship. Receiving funding support from these two programs has enriched my 
thesis, enabling me to conduct research at the UAE National Archives, the Middle East Centre 
Archive at St Antony’s College, Oxford, and the British Library of Political and Economic 
Science.  
I would like to thank my parents, John and Keri Folmar, for their undying support (and 
for reading every draft!). I would also like to thank my grandparents for their encouragement and 
care for my studies. My family has pushed me towards further intellectual curiosity and given me 
the opportunity to grow as a scholar.
 1 
Introduction 
From the earliest moments of his rise to power, renowned Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel 
Nasser focused much attention on the small-town schoolhouse. His electrifying speeches, 
championing an emancipated Arab citizen loyal to the cause of the Egyptian government, were 
greeted with frenzied crowds. In one such speech, given in 1953 at a school in lower Egypt, 
Nasser proclaimed: “every individual can accomplish much if he works in the interests of Egypt, 
forgetting himself and denying himself … we will not be able to remove the [colonial] usurper 
except by force, unity, and self-denial.”1 Focusing on the contribution of each individual to a 
greater cause, Egypt’s revolutionary government demanded self-sacrificial allegiance and 
promised liberation as its reward. Schoolchildren responded to this message, which was 
disseminated by the state’s educational system. Egypt’s new regime rewrote textbooks, opened 
teacher training institutes, expanded policy concerning universal education, and even sent its 
teachers abroad to the surrounding Arab World. The schoolhouse had become the locus of 
revolutionary change. 
One year before Nasser delivered this speech, he had helped execute a military coup 
d’état that dethroned Egypt’s monarchical structure, claiming victory as the Free Officers’ 
revolutionary movement. The overthrow of British-backed King Farouk’s 16-year reign marked 
the end of foreign rule in Egypt. One of the first major military coups in the region, this 
movement began a new era in the history of Egypt and of the wider Middle East. The Free 
Officers’ political philosophy opposed foreign intervention in the Arab world, critiqued the 
corruption of the Egyptian monarchy, and offered an authentic alternative to previous ruling 
 
1 Transcript of Gamal Abdel Nasser, Kelemat al-Bakbashi Gamal Abdel Nasser fiy al-Meydan al-Was’a amam 
Madrasat Aja al-Thanawiyya bi-Damietta, 09 April 1953, Bibliotheca Alexandria Archives. 
All translations are my own, unless otherwise noted. 
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regimes. It envisioned an economically equitable society unified around the Arab identity and 
poised for development and production.2 Soon after the revolution of July 1952, Gamal Abdel 
Nasser assumed the presidency, consolidating power and developing a framework of Arab 
nationalism, Cold War non-alignment, Arab socialism, and post-colonial emancipation. He 
innovated an Egyptian brand of Arab nationalism. This movement rejected the borders of the 
post-World War II Middle East and advocated true unification of the Arab nation – complete 
with political cooperation and geographical consolidation. 
Much has been written about the shift of government power in this era, tracing the end of 
the monarchy, the rise of the “cult of Nasserism” and the subsequent structural changes in Egypt. 
The historical literature concerning Nasserism and the 1952 revolutionary period focuses on the 
issues of ideological framework, leadership charisma, third-world modernization, and anti-
colonial resistance. These four categories have dominated the historical discussion of Nasserism, 
which dwindled after the 1970s. 
Recent scholars, however, have begun to view revolutionary Egypt from new angles. 
Rather than maintaining focus on overt power shifts and governmental structure, the mid-
twentieth century Egyptian state is increasingly portrayed as a “great social laboratory”.3 
Simulating a state of crisis and revolutionary transition, Nasser was able to make sweeping 
changes, and much of what he changed was not merely structural. Fresh scholarship illustrates 
the varied origins of this period’s rapid social change. In this vein, I will argue that education 
 
2 Reem Abou-El-Fadl, Foreign Policy as Nation Making: Turkey and Egypt in the Cold War (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2019), 101. 
3 Omnia El-Shakry, The Great Social Laboratory: Subjects of Knowledge in Colonial and Postcolonial Egypt 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), 8. 
This concept originates with Dr. Omnia El-Shakry, who seeks to illustrate the “discursive field mapped out by the 
contested ideological terrain of post-1952 Egypt”, (206) in part by portraying the “relationship between the 
institutional structures underpinning knowledge production in… postcolonial Egypt and state sponsorship of such 
knowledge production” (14). 
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was a central tool in Nasser’s statebuilding toolbox. The revolutionary regime used soft power 
structures to shape the ideology of the Egyptian people in the period after 1952. Using the 
educational system to instill revolutionary values in Egypt’s students, the regime was crafting a 
new Arab individual – one who contributed to the needs of society, rejected the influence of 
colonial powers, and belonged to the unified Arab nation. 
My inquiry is guided by several questions: Why was such emphasis placed on the domain 
of education in Egypt’s revolutionary period? Why was the classroom deemed by the 
government as essential to the experience of every Egyptian citizen? What were the ideological 
messages being conveyed to Egypt’s students and how were these messages expressed in the 
classroom? Looking to the Arab classroom setting outside of Egypt’s borders – what was the 
impetus behind the post-revolution expansion of Egyptian teacher secondment? Should Egypt’s 
educational influence be attributed merely to its uncontested educational superiority? Or was this 
influence politically calculated? 
I have sought to answer these questions by consulting both Arabic and English primary 
source material. Rather than focusing on government policy and public speeches, I have explored 
the political undertones of the Egyptian state’s soft power mechanisms. Dividing into two main 
sections, part one of this paper will address the expression of Nasser’s etatist, Arab nationalist 
governing ideology within the domain of education, paying particular attention to Arabic-
language source material. Focusing on state-published history curricula, United Arab Republic 
(UAR)4 state yearbooks, the writings of contemporary Egyptian political commentators, state-
published school songs, teacher and student memoir, and the testimony of revolution-era Arab 
 
4 The state of Egypt took on the name United Arab Republic (UAR) upon its 1958 union with Syria. Though Syria 
seceded from this union in 1961, Egypt kept the name UAR until 1971. Thus, throughout the majority of the 
chronological scope of this paper, Egypt’s official name was the UAR. 
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educationalists, part one will demonstrate how the classroom was used to achieve the goals of the 
revolution. The second section of this paper will follow the expansion of the Egyptian 
educational agenda into the modernizing Eastern Arabian Peninsula. It makes use of teacher 
emigration statistics, Arab and Western news articles, British government intelligence material, 
first-hand accounts of political activity from the Eastern Gulf, messages from Cairo’s Voice of 
the Arabs radio broadcast, UAR government documents, and Egyptian evaluation documents 
concerning the state of education in certain Gulf states. Part two argues that the Egyptian state 
played a politically calculated role in the foundation and development of the educational systems 
of these Eastern Gulf countries, impressing Nasserist Arab nationalism upon a generation of 
students throughout the Arab world. 
The revolutionary classroom engendered a Nasserist worldview in the minds of Egyptian 
students. President Nasser was lauded, loyalty to the state was rewarded, and wholehearted 
resonance with revolutionary values was expected. The government’s formidable presence 
stretched outside the borders of Egypt, making impressions on the schoolhouses of the Gulf 
through expatriate teachers. These teachers exported the Egyptian state’s worldview across the 
Arab world. Education was used under Nasser’s regime to mobilize and influence the area that 
was referred to as al-umma al-a’rabiya – the Arab motherland. 
In the days of Egypt’s past regimes, the profession of teaching had been marginalized, 
nearly deemed unskilled labor. But after the revolution, Egyptian teachers – both within Egypt 
and throughout the Arab world – were sent on a distinguished mission to spread the good news 
of Arab unification and hegemony. No longer merely caretakers, these employees of the 
government were given a higher purpose – the growth and success of the revolutionary Arab 
nationalist movement. Teachers had become an arm of the Egyptian state. Indeed, along with the 
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propagandistic Egyptian press and wildly successful Voice of the Arabs radio station, Egypt’s 
most politically-motivated teachers made their mark on the young Gulf states. The gospel of 




Chapter One: Revolutionizing the Egyptian Classroom 
“... educational curricula must be reconsidered according to the principles of the 
revolution”5 - Egypt’s National Charter, 1962 
 
In 1953, the year after the Free Officer’s Revolution, the name of the Egyptian 
government’s educational department was changed. Wizarat al-Ma’arif, the old name dating 
back to the Ottoman period, translates as the Ministry of Knowledge. It became known as 
Wizarat al-Tarbiyya wa al-Ta’liim — Ministry of Childrearing and Education.6 This change was 
purposeful, signifying the state’s new perspective on education. The term tarbiyya, added to the 
Ministry’s name, is familial. It denotes childrearing, human development, and the cultivation of 
morals. With the rise of the revolutionary government, the classroom was transformed from a 
place of information transfer to a tool of knowledge and identity production. These developments 
within Egypt’s educational establishment after the 1952 revolution were more than mere name 
change. The central goal of education had become tathqiif abna’ al-sha’ab — the enculturation 
of the children of the nation’s masses.7 A philosophy of nationalism, collectivism, and Egyptian 
exceptionalism was undergirding these radical shifts in education. President Gamal Abdel-
Nasser was attempting to define and enforce his vision for the state of Egypt. He aimed at the 
country’s transformation — from struggling member of the third-world to sole leader of the 
“Arab circle”.8 The revolutionary government would attempt to impose these changes in national 
identity, political values, and world order through the Egyptian classroom.  
 
5 Mahmoud Awad Taha, Mithaq al-Thawra (Cairo: Maktabat Jaziirat al-Ward, 1962), 183. 
6 I have chosen to translate the term tarbiyya as childrearing. Dr. Samy Ayoub has noted that the term does not have 
clear direct translation to English, but denotes “discipline, cultivating certain morals, bringing up”. Its shades of 
meaning also denote a sense of oversight and responsibility. 
Ahmed Isma’il Al-Hajji, al-Tarikh al-Thaqafi lil-Ta’liim fiy Misr (Cairo: Dar al-Fikr al-Araby, 2002), 292.  
7 Gregory Starrett, Putting Islam to Work: Education, Politics, and Religious Transformation in Egypt (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1998), 78-79.  
8 Gamal Abdel Nasser, Egypt’s Liberation: The Philosophy of the Revolution, trans. Dorothy Thomson. 
(Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1955), 85. 
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Despite the importance of education to Nasser’s plan of national transformation, this 
aspect of Egypt’s history is underrepresented among published works. Little has been written 
from within Egyptian society that analyzes the 1952 regime’s educational reforms, providing 
historians with few beneficial sources.9 Part of this is due to significant continuity in aspects of 
the educational system during the periods before and after the revolution.10 Members of the 
Egyptian political establishment had been working towards the universalization of elementary 
education since the 1940’s.11 Though Nasser was seemingly following the example of previous 
educational reformers, he was not merely opening up new institutions of learning and training 
more teachers. Rather, he was reshaping and mobilizing Egypt’s educational system to promote 
the government’s ideological creed and further its statebuilding agenda. Egyptian schools 
became extensions of state control, aiming to instill students with personal loyalty to the ruling 
regime, increase national productivity, and strengthen citizen engagement in post-colonial Arab 
political pursuits. 
The numbers alone point to a significant increase in government support for the 
educational establishment — during the thirteen years following the 1952 Revolution, total 
expenditure on education “is estimated at three times the entire expenditure on education over 
the seventy years from the British occupation in 1882 to the outbreak of the Revolution”.12 In 
addition to these budget increases, efforts were made to develop the content of the educational 
system soon after the Revolution. Amir Boktor, a professor of education at the American 
 
9 Saʻīd Ismāʻīl ʻAlī, Tajribat Thawrat 23 Yūliyū 1952 fī al-taʻlīm, (al-Qāhirah: Dār al-Thaqāfah lil-Ṭibāʻah wa-al-
Nashr, 1983), 3.  
10 Ahmed Abdalla, The Student Movement and National Politics in Egypt, 1923-1973, (London: Al-Saqi Books, 
1985), 101. 
11 Iman Farag, “A Great Vocation, A Modest Profession: Teachers’ Paths and Practices,” in Cultures of Arab 
Schooling: Critical Ethnographies from Egypt ed. Linda Herrera, Carlos Alberto Torres (Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 2006), 113.  
12 Abdalla, Student Movement and National Politics, 101. 
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University in Cairo notes that “the most striking phenomenon in the evolution of education in 
Egypt under the present regime [United Arab Republic] is that of extensive expansion — 
expansion in budget, in number of schools, in teachers, in students, in organization and 
administration, in classes, in activities, and in curricula. This expansion has gone far beyond the 
corresponding increase of population.”13 The revolutionary regime prioritized education and its 
expansion. But despite its numerical growth, the quality of teaching in Egyptian classrooms 
continued to lag behind.14  
Why was such emphasis placed on the domain of education in particular in the post-
revolutionary period? Why was the classroom deemed by the government as essential to the 
experience of every Egyptian citizen? Prior to the revolution of 1952, Egypt’s educational 
system had been influenced by foreign powers. Different languages, curricula, and values were 
espoused inside the classrooms of Egypt’s schools. The British founded their first school in 
Egypt in 1815, establishing a century-long colonial legacy of private education. Though they 
were bastions of “the customs and traditions of their own respective nations”, many Egyptian 
students attended these schools.15 Foreign education had overshadowed Egyptian primary and 
secondary education for years, owing to missionary impetus and international funding. And 
previous to the influence of western powers, the Ottoman Empire had maintained political 
control over much of the Arab world, including Egypt.16 However, during Egypt’s nationalist 
revolution of 1919, the foreign education system began to be dismantled.17 This earlier attempt at 
 
13 Amir Boktor, The Development and Expansion of Education in the United Arab Republic (Cairo: American 
University at Cairo Press, 1963), 5. 
14 Rushdi Labib, Tārīkh wa-niẓām al-taʻlīm fī Jumhūrīyat Miṣr al-ʻArabīyah (Cairo: Maktabat al-ʼAnjlū al-Miṣriyah, 
1972), 222. 
15 Boktor, Development and Expansion of Education, 73. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Hussam Ahmed, in his article “Egyptian Cultural Expansionism”, argues for “important continuity between 
Egypt’s so-called liberal age and the Nasserite era that followed”, portraying how the founding of Egyptian 
 9 
educational independence resonated with the emancipatory post-colonial value system of 
President Nasser, for whom every foreign school was a symbol of heavy-handed external 
influence on the history of the Egyptian nation. Indeed, Nasser’s revolutionary era was 
characterized by an “Egyptianization-Arabization process” that permeated the education system 
— increased supervision by the Ministry of Education required government approval of all 
courses, textbooks, and imposed seminars for the training of history and civics teachers.18 
What was the ideology of Nasser’s revolution, and how was it expressed in the everyday 
lives of Egyptian students? This chapter explores the etatist, expansionist nature of Nasser’s 
government and identifies the pressure of these features on Egypt’s educational system in the 
later part of the twentieth century. It will define Nasser’s ideology and his plan for Egypt, and 
observe how the message of the revolution was promulgated inside the classroom.  
Nasser’s Revolutionary Ideology 
The third world-centric, emancipatory rhetoric of Gamal Abdel-Nasser opposed all that 
Egypt’s foreign-controlled education system represented. Nasser quickly gained a reputation as a 
visionary leader who was transforming Egypt, but his ideology was hard to define. Robert 
Stephens describes it as “an amalgam of nationalist and social, sometimes socialist, ideas.”19 The 
government’s emphasis began at national independence and Arab unity, but eventually changed 
to questions of social change and economic development.20 The state’s political ideology adapted 
as Egypt’s situation changed. Though Nasser’s rise to power was seen by the Egyptian people as 
 
educational institutes throughout the Arab world represented an expansionist political strategy established before the 
1952 Revolution. 
18 R. Hrair Dekmejian, Egypt Under Nasir: A Study in Political Dynamics (Albany: SUNY Press, 1971), 84. 
19 Robert Henry Stephens, Nasser: A Political Biography (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1971), 253. 
20 Ibid. 
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a revolution driven by ideals, one could more accurately describe Nasserism as a flexible 
worldview set upon a framework of axioms.21  
Nasser recorded his vision for Egypt in Philosophy of the Revolution, which reads like 
shallow rhetoric rather than political philosophy. In it, he lays out six fundamental revolutionary 
goals: putting an end to imperialism and its supporters; achieving social justice; eliminating 
feudalism; ending capitalist control of the government; developing a strong national army; and 
establishing a strong national democratic life.22 To accomplish these goals, Nasser advocated for 
a radical shift in the Egyptian citizen’s paradigm. Popularized through speeches, pamphlets, 
news articles, and textbooks, the revolutionary worldview sought to imbue citizens with a 
profound sense of national pride, optimism, and contentment.23 The ideal citizen was clearly 
defined: industrious, mildly religious, and supportive of the government’s endeavors. And this 
ideal citizen became the project of the educational system. Shaping students into “happy rural 
citizens” became an “explicit justification for educational extension.”24 Nasser placed his value 
framework at the center of Egyptian education, and crafted the system around himself as the 
ultimate representation of nationalism and Arab unity.25 Therefore, one must first look into this 
value system before analyzing the success of its implementation in the classroom.  
Firstly, Nasser’s philosophy was future-focused. It centers on the importance of tatawwur 
(advancement) and taqaddum (development), stressing Egypt’s need for industrialization and 
 
21 Ibid. 
22 Laurie Brand, Official Stories: Politics and National Narratives in Egypt and Algeria (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2014), 35. 
23 Linda Herrera, “Islamization and Education: Between Politics, Profit, and Pluralism,” in Cultures of Arab 
Schooling: Critical Ethnographies from Egypt ed. Linda Herrera, Carlos Alberto Torres (Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 2006), 25-30.  
24 Starrett, Putting Islam to Work, 78-79.  
25 Nasser was conceived of as the greatest Egyptian patriot and an example to be followed. Um Kalthoum sang Ya 
Gamal, Ya Mithal al-Wataniyya, which translates to ‘O Gamal, O Ultimate Example of Nationalism’, as a tribute to 
his presidency. This song was broadcast throughout Egypt and the entire Arab World through the government’s Sout 
al-’Arab radio service.  
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modernization.26 His rhetoric creates a set of epistemological categories by contrasting al-
rajia’aiyya — backwardness — with the enlightenment of the revolutionary mindset.27 Nasser 
supported the establishment of a new value system, characterizing it as a “social revolution” in 
which morality is reordered in line with socialist commitments and a secularist value framework. 
Nasser’s rhetoric of state-planning is utopian, aiming at a state of constant societal equilibrium in 
contrast to the “self-suspicion, egoism, and hatred” of landowners in pre-Revolutionary Egypt.28  
Contrasting with the “evils of past authority”, Nasser portrays himself as the final 
revolutionary in a chain of leaders, following ‘Urabi and Zaghloul in their attempts to lead the 
Egyptian people in “governing themselves”, and becoming “masters of their fate.”29 He reshapes 
the history of Egypt with the July 23 Revolution as its apex. Yoav Di-Capua details the birth of 
“revolutionary historiography”, demonstrating how Egypt’s historians “treated the past as a mere 
series of analogies and metaphors whose object was to demonstrate the glorious achievement of 
the postcolonial moment of triumph.”30 Without a doubt, a teleological narrative of historical 
advance underlay the political rhetoric of the revolutionary period.31 Portrayals of the victory of 
the revolution take on salvific tones, with Nasser taking on the role of messiah-like figure, 
leading his people into true enlightenment and restoration. Jesse Ferris notes that the messianic 
tones of Nasserism “tended to push Egypt into uncompromising positions of principle and 
 
26 Kirk Beattie, Egypt During the Nasser Years: Ideology, Politics, and Civil Society (Boulder: Westview Press, 
1994), 117-118. 
27 Gamal Abdel Nasser, The Philosophy of the Revolution, trans. John Badeau. (Buffalo: Keynes & Marshall, 1959), 
36. 
28 Ibid., 37. 
29 Ibid., 25. 
30 Yoav Di-Capua, Gatekeepers of the Arab Past: Historians and History Writing in Twentieth-Century Egypt 
(Berkley: University of California Press, 2009), 249. 
31 Laura Bier, Revolutionary Womanhood: Feminisms, Modernity, and the State in Nasser's Egypt (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2011), 53. 
 12 
fanciful overextension.”32 The future development of the country, is conflated with the success 
of Nasser’s national plan. Revolutionary success will only be achieved when its values have been 
distributed throughout every Egyptian village.  
Secondly, Nasser’s philosophy was reactionary, focused on the relationship of the 
Egyptian people with their colonial past. His perspective pronounced judgement upon past 
occupation, and urged the Egyptian populous to unite in hostility toward values contrary to the 
government’s. His vision for Egyptians demanded a collective rejection of all ideology that 
would oppose the revolution’s. Nasser called for “a cultural revolution which will be hostile to 
imperialism, hostile to backwardness, hostile to feudalism, hostile to the domination and 
dictatorship of capitalism, hostile to all kinds of exploitation — a cultural revolution which aims 
informing the people...who their friends and enemies are.”33 These broad characterizations of 
categories like capitalism and exploitation allowed the Egyptian state to condemn all competing 
ideologies. In this framework, the state begins taking the place of the citizen’s conscience, 
denouncing those values that would conflict with the ruling agenda. Omnia El-Shakry comments 
that the postcolonial Egyptian state had become “the embodiment of a rational consciousness.”34 
The state’s consciousness would, through modes of knowledge production, filter into the mindset 
of the Egyptian citizen.  
Nasser’s attempt to seed Egypt’s culture with hostility to Western ideologies further 
distances any threat to the new order established by the revolution. Post-colonial Egypt had been 
swept up into the Nasserist metanarrative — Arab enlightenment as the source of progress and 
 
32 Jesse Ferris, Nasser's Gamble: How Intervention in Yemen Caused the Six-Day War and the Decline of Egyptian 
Power (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017), 12. 
 
33 Muhammed Anis, “Hawl Qadiyyat al-Taghayyur al-Thaqafi,” Al-Hilal 9, (September 1967), 5. 
34 El-Shakry, The Great Social Laboratory, 206. 
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capitalist domination as the reason for backwardness. Questions of cultural authenticity and lack 
of progress were answered, in Nasser’s framework, by a triumphalist narrative in which the 
Egyptian people had finally claimed victory. This narrative upholds the power of the newly 
established government and rallies the people against any return of foreign influence.  
Thirdly, as Gamal Abdel-Nasser’s presidency progressed, Pan-Arabism became a central 
part of the Egyptian agenda. This was reflected at the local level in the increased focus on 
collective identity and shared national destiny. Thus emerged the new Arab man and woman — 
rational, productive, engendered with a sense of duty to the state. Denial of self and loyalty to the 
national collective identity were held up as virtuous attributes.35 Ultimately, revolutionary 
philosophy called for the importance of societal homogeneity. Nasser explains that Egyptian 
society “will crystalize; its component parts will hold together; it will form a homogeneous 
entity”, after a period in which the Egyptian people “strain our nerves during the period of 
transition.”36 
According to the Nasserist narrative, two simultaneous revolutions were ongoing in 
revolutionary Egypt — the political and the social. The political revolution stood for national 
sovereignty and self-determination, while the social revolution was a change of mindset, a 
“dilemma faced by many anticolonial nationalists”.37 This revolutionary philosophy had large 
aspirations. Under Nasser, Egypt began to claim greater international influence and 
responsibility, filling a power vacuum left by past colonial powers. Nasser began to pronounce 
Egypt’s moral responsibility to reverse “the era of isolation”, arguing that “every country must 
look beyond its frontiers to find out … what its positive role could be in this troubled world.”38 
 
35 Starrett, Putting Islam to Work, 78. 
36 Abdel Nasser, The Philosophy of the Revolution, 52. 
37 El-Shakry, The Great Social Laboratory, 203. 
38 Abdel Nasser, The Philosophy of the Revolution, 59. 
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More than just spreading development and resources, Egypt was responsible for spreading the 
ideals of the revolution throughout the greater Arab world. It became self-evident to Nasser that 
“there is an Arab circle surrounding us and that this circle is as much a part of us as we are a part 
of it, and that our history has been mixed with it and that its interests are linked with ours.”39 
Egypt was central to the project of decolonization, and Nasser’s vision held up the unified Arab 
Republic as the means of accomplishing that. Decolonization necessitated Egyptian dominance.  
The rhetoric surrounding Arab unity is often connected to Egyptian influence and 
supremacy. In his Philosophy of the Revolution, Nasser explains the Arab “capacity for work” 
and the “strength of this bond which links us and which makes our territory one”. Seeing the 
Arab world as unified, he then addresses the Egyptian people in particular: “Such is the first 
circle in which we must resolve and attempt to move in as much as we possibly can. It is the 
Arab circle.”40 The Arab circle was the domain in which the revolutionary government intended 
to consolidate influence.  
Built upon these principles, the ideological revolution in Egypt was underway, following 
on the heels of the regime change in 1952. In the early sixties, Nasser turned leftward towards 
Arab socialism, taking a more heavy-handed approach to state planning.41 He called for socialist 
training, explaining that “a big ideological battle is in the making at home and abroad”, and 
ultimately urged that revolutionary councils would be established in every village to suppress 
“reactionary elements”.42 As a result of this shift, the state continued to consolidate power. Its 
ideology of planning set up a government-centered elite, establishing “a new class of experts, 
 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid., 74. 
41 Jack Crabbs, “Politics, History, and Culture in Nasser’s Egypt,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 6, 
no. 4 (October 1975): 386. 
42 Beattie, Egypt During the Nasser Years, 159. 
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engineers, and intellectuals as both agents of modernization and its exemplars.”43 Egyptian 
society had been mobilized in support of the state. 
When asked about political theory, Nasser replied: “our revolutionary application may be 
prior to the theory. Then what is the theory? The theory is the evidence of the action.”44 Tough to 
pinpoint, Nasser was unwilling to openly align himself with a philosophy of governance — 
neither on the stage of Cold War proxy conflict nor at the domestic level. Kirk Beattie writes that 
“the officer-rulers” of the July 23 Revolution “basked in the popularity of nationalistic, anti-
imperialist, and Pan-Arab victories” but “failed to develop the ideological basis for a hegemonic 
bloc that defined their relationship to other political currents and social classes and justify their 
transnational authoritarian rule”.45 At its essence, the Free Officers’ Revolution was a military 
coup-turned populist movement. This movement centered on Nasser as its hero whose leadership 
was calculated to centralize control and eulogize himself. The praise of Nasser, along with the 
core tenets of Arab unity and Egyptian exceptionalism, remained central to Egypt’s new political 
doctrine.  
Roel Meijer labels Nasser’s rule an “authoritarian modernism”, identifying the subtle 
transition of his regime from democratic reformism to a project-driven, state-focused “program 
of reform from above”.46 During Nasser’s presidency, the state became omnipresent. Intervening 
among intellectuals, changing the structure of the job market, and even taking a role in family 
planning, the Egyptian government was shaping the minute affairs of its citizens.47 The 
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development of this authoritarian rule was accomplished in part by the state’s soft power 
structures. Omnia El-Shakry’s analysis corroborates, challenging previous scholarship on the 
statebuilding technique of Nasser’s regime. El-Shakry claims that “Nasserism was based on an 
assemblage of institutional apparatuses, technocratic practices, and modes of knowledge 
production, rather than simply on emotional appeals.”48 Under this concept of Nasserism, El-
Shakry addresses several implications of the state’s role after the July 23rd Revolution. Though 
she focuses on aspects of citizen affairs —  social welfare, land reform, and labor activism — 
she leaves education out of the analysis.  
Following El-Shakry’s widened conception of Nasserism as a comprehensive national 
philosophy, I argue that the revolutionary regime made use of modes of knowledge production to 
confirm and consolidate power. As El-Shakry unpacks Nasser’s “comparison of the state to a 
family that could not feed itself”, I look into the similar microcosm of the classroom.49 The 
national education system was one of the most powerful and effective tools in the revolutionary 
state’s toolbox. The schoolhouse was central to the project of inculcating “revolutionary” ideals 
in the minds of Egyptian students.  
In his booklet titled Egypt’s Liberation, Nasser portrays his plan for education, the story 
of the Egyptian people, and the mission of the July 23 Revolution.  
“I do not want to claim for myself the role of a history professor; nothing could be 
further from my mind. But were any elementary school student to attempt a study of 
the struggles of our people, he would discover that the revolution of July 23rd 
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marks the realization of the hope held by the people of Egypt since they began, in 
modern times, to think of self-government and complete sovereignty.”50 
Nasser intends that the glories and successes of the revolution would become self-evident 
to any elementary student. He would bring this vision to life throughout his presidency, shaping 
Egypt’s system of education and creating a collective cultural history of the July 23 Revolution 
as a pinnacle of the country’s past and a beacon for its future. Nasser’s plan for the growth of the 
revolution relied upon the trajectory of education in Egypt.  
Education: The Revolutionary Ideology Imposed 
 Nasser once wrote that: “Building factories is easy, building canals is easy, building dams 
is easy — but building men, that is the harshest difficulty.”51 His strategy for “building men”, in 
large part, made use of education. In the eyes of Nasser, the classroom was the laboratory of 
ideology inculcation, teachers playing the role of statebuilder by shaping future citizens. One 
contemporary commentator wrote: “in the midst of this intellectual disorder, the school desires to 
raise individuals as citizens of their homeland, believers in its philosophy so that they can 
contribute to the life of the nation with all their hearts and with all their minds and with all their 
wills.”52 Faith in the revolutionary regime was stirred up in the Egyptian schoolhouse. The 
government was constructing the ideal citizen, wielding a system of state planning that 
transcended literacy statistics. Children — Egypt’s students — were viewed as the “human raw 
material of the future”.53 All that had been laid out in the revolutionary ideology — the 
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importance of Arab unity, an attitude of post-colonial freedom, the value of work and 
productivity — was being impressed upon students with the aim of producing the ideal Arab 
citizen. Rather than giving the student skills, the teacher was imbuing him with values. Rather 
than empowering him as an individual, the teacher was encouraging a collectivist mindset.54  
The 1963 UAR yearbook explains the state’s perspective on education: “Since the very 
first day of its inception the Revolution has had great faith in the value of education, and 
regarded it as the true weapon of the revolutionary will.”55 Through rote memorization of 
passages, textbook and curriculum changes, and even the songs of schoolchildren, the Egyptian 
government was consciously creating wholehearted citizen-believers.56 In 1952, mere months 
after the July Revolution, the newly established Free Officer regime attempted its first 
comprehensive, involved reorganization of the educational system.57 While promoting literacy, 
Egyptianization, and modernization within schools, the “new governing elite” was also using the 
school to produce a society “alive to its national responsibilities, not to mention the revolutionary 
tasks ahead of eventually building a socialist society and political system.”58 Each student would 
play a part in achieving the goals of the revolution. Through the school system, citizens were 
endowed with a sense of ownership and responsibility for the future of Egypt, which would 
blossom into full-fledged support for the regime.  
Egyptian educationalist Sa’id Isma’il Ali explained in The Experiment of the Revolution 
in Education that the principles of the Revolution must be taught in the classroom “because 
education and childrearing are the two things that shape the people and their mentalities, skills, 
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and wills with which they desire social change and shape it”.59 After the overthrow of Egypt’s 
monarchy, the regime’s goal translated into cultural overhaul and authority consolidation. The 
educational system was utilized to imbue the student with an understanding of “the needs of 
society, the requisites of the age, the goals of nationalism, which the student will face after he 
leaves school and truly becomes a citizen.”60 Collectivism, contribution to national development, 
and societal awareness were prioritized in schools. The classroom was used to mobilize Egyptian 
citizens with the ideology of the revolutionary regime. Education had become focused 
exclusively on engendering social change in line with the values of the revolution.  
Under the revolutionary government, teachers were no longer merely charged with 
equipping individuals with the skills needed to build productive and fulfilling lives. Rather, their 
job became distinctly political. The apolitical academic was urged to descend from his “ivory 
tower”, to “participate” in society, and to play his part in instilling a “socialist mentality”.61 
Educated Egyptians in general were chided for being slow to divest their minds of “everything 
...which depends on the capitalist mentality, camouflaged behind [the concept of] the 
inviolability of individual freedom and the legend of ‘Art for Art's Sake’”.62 For Nasser’s 
government, every pursuit was political. Freedom of thought was squelched for the sake of 
collective enculturation. Arts were de-emphasized while scientific research, development, and 
production were incentivized.63 According to Louis Awad, the regime was enforcing “the 
persecution of the theoretical sciences for the sake of applied sciences in the name of 
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development”.64 Modes of knowledge production had become systems where students learned 
the social values of the revolution and were shaped into productive contributors.  
 Training manuals for students in teacher education programs defined religious education 
as ‘spiritual development’ (al-namw al-ruhi). Attempting to achieve a “balance between personal 
piety and mass mobilization”, these manuals encouraged future teachers to provide children with 
sound doctrine and religious commitment, while preparing them for working life in the local 
environment.65 Teachers were encouraged to instill in the pupil “devotion to the milieu in which 
he lives, loving and having pride in it, and not looking down on it.” They were also tasked with 
instilling pride in the greater Arab nation and preparing the child for life in “a cooperative, 
...socialist society.”66 Contentment and cooperation were central values to the revolutionary 
regime, encouraged by teachers within the classroom.  
Though teachers played the role of statebuilder in the classroom, educational historian 
Mohamed Abu El-Asaad criticizes the treatment of educators during the revolutionary era. He 
questions why “we leave the fingerprints of capitalism and feudalism on one hundred and twenty 
thousand [teachers] when we are asking them to bring up our new generations according to the 
ideas, principles, and goals of socialism?”67 The school had become a place of ideological 
incubation. Egyptian teachers served the purposes of the regime’s brand of socialism.  
Though the profession of teaching was traditionally scorned in Egypt, it was elevated by 
the revolutionary government.68 Under this new regime, the teacher was playing an important 
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role in the ongoing cultural revolution. Sarhan El-Demerdash, Dean of Education at Ain Shams 
University during the sixties and participant in Nasser-era Teachers’ Institutes, wrote: 
“Thousands of teachers are needed for undertaking this noble mission…. Teachers need to be 
educated to meet local needs and to meet the needs of other countries”.69 The importance of 
teaching to the shaping of society had been recognized by the regime, and thus the profession 
was elevated. Contemporary accounts note that, in many villages, the teachers or headmasters 
participated in committees set up as local manifestations of Nasser’s mass political party, the 
Arab Socialist Union. These teachers were particularly active in using schools for political 
indoctrination.70 Even if teachers in certain villages were not particularly politically motivated, 
“schools up and down the Nile Valley rang daily with the shouted chant “Nasser! Nasser! 
Nasser!” along with the repetition of revolutionary slogans.”71  
During the revolutionary period, a classroom pedagogy of rote learning and 
memorization was emphasized. James Mayfield, an American diplomat who conducted 
educational fieldwork in Egypt in 1966, recalls visiting village schools in which students proudly 
recited “portions of Nasser’s speeches” and were trained to “shout...a word symbolizing some 
aspect of the regime’s ideology” upon entering the classroom.72 The school day was saturated 
with political rhetoric. The technique of rote learning was so prevalent and deeply ingrained that 
it left its mark on the universities. An analysis of the Egyptian educational establishment notes 
that: “in Egypt the emphasis remains upon formal lecture, and students are accorded little 
opportunity for discussion, questioning, or meeting with the professor ...Students resort to 
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cramming and memorising... the textbook.” Students were heavily dependent upon textbooks, 
not seriously evaluating their accuracy.73 Kuwaiti educationalist Darwish Al-Miqdadi criticized 
Egypt’s educational program for these reasons, claiming that it aimed at “cramming facts and 
passing examinations” without considering “the broader aspects of education, with the health and 
discipline that should go along with it.”74 Critically-minded inquiry into history, political 
science, and the other humanities was discouraged. Instead, a narrative published by the Ministry 
of Childrearing and Education was considered sufficient classroom knowledge.  
School curricula was the primary method of defining Egypt’s statehood and the role of 
the Egyptian citizen. From the very beginning of the revolution, the re-writing of curricula — 
especially history books — was recognized as a top priority for the new regime.75 Materials were 
published that endeared Nasser and his philosophy to the Egyptian student. Religious books were 
changed, developed to emphasize the regime’s principles of governance and encouraging 
wholehearted citizen participation in the political project. The Arabic language was increasingly 
central to the revolutionary classroom, strengthening the collective Arab identity and de-
emphasizing foreign education. These new curricula were generally deemed to contain “little 
serious discussion of social or political problems, but a great deal of propaganda and historical 
mythology”.76 
Textbooks generally established a triumphalist narrative, glossing over dingy periods in 
Egyptian history. An author of one of these texts, when asked why the textbooks chapters barely 
treated four centuries of Ottoman rule in the Arab East, claimed that the Ottoman age should be 
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left out because it is a dark period in Arab history. He had decided to treat only the brighter 
periods.77 The curricular philosophy of this particular author was characteristic of the entire 
governmental apparatus. Nasser’s regime paid significant attention to the curricula at schools and 
universities, reformulating textbooks and assigning government documents as part of the agenda. 
The National Charter of 1961 itself became a school textbook, declaring that “... educational 
curricula must be reconsidered according to the principles of the revolution”.78 Egyptian students 
were encouraged to learn the Charter by heart.79  
One critic of Nasser’s regime ridiculed the perception of the National Charter as “a holy 
book!”, explaining that “it was taught at schools… and became a curriculum to pass or fail” and 
claiming that “the Qur’an was not honored in the same manner”.80 The revolutionary regime was 
impressing its governing principles upon students as unquestioned religious dogma, not mere 
political theory. Former student activist Ahmed Abdallah recalls: “The subjects of the ‘social 
curriculum’ were firmly politicized and written in a highly demagogic language that mingled 
national pride with political loyalty to the regime.”81 No criticism of the Arab nation, past or 
present, was permitted. Indeed, critics of the regime claimed that the school curriculum had 
become a system of myth propagation. 
Religious education was also greatly affected after the July 23 revolutionary regime 
change — the classroom was presented with a socialized version of Islam.82 In his analysis of 
religion throughout the 1952 Revolution, Rif’at Sayyid Ahmad writes that according to Nasser, 
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“religion, like history and heritage, exist merely to be benefitted from and represent the strength 
of the future-oriented Arab Nationalist movement.”83 Religion had become the government’s 
tool of value enforcement. The regime began to shape religious rhetoric around “values like 
faith, patience, justice, and destiny, transforming religion from an outward battle to inward 
experience and personal emotions” creating “a connection between doctrine and the accelerated 
economic and social changes”.84 After the 1952 Revolution, the mandatory religious education 
program was rewritten, with new Islamic studies textbooks released in 1958-59. These books 
presented a regime-mandated perspective on Islam, introducing students to an Islamicized set of 
“social values necessary to a popular reconstruction of society by the masses: sincerity, fulfilling 
obligations, forbearance, and the rights of the nation”.85 There was a marked increase in 
classroom discussion of the value of jihad, which was framed “for ideological purposes against 
external enemies like the new state of Israel.”86 The teaching of religion became a tool for 
enforcing the regime’s values. 
 Several books were published by the Ministry of Childrearing and Education that 
eulogized recent political events under the new regime. One of these books, titled The Battle of 
Freedom, commemorated Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal. Used in the classroom, the 
first half of this book was dedicated to a glorified retelling of the event. The second half, titled 
“Goals of the Battle”, speaks directly to students, using second person plural. ّIt calls the student 
to “resume your studies today with jihad in the battle to share in the victories of the future”, 
fusing the student’s daily work with the state’s grand destiny. The book even presents songs of 
praise for the nationalization of the canal: “Praise God, God is great! O Egypt, you were 
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protected from shame and disgrace! You were protected from the trap of the deceiving 
colonizer!”.87 The religious and anti-colonial rhetoric of Nasserism merge together to create a 
value framework for the student, which bases itself in the strong-armed state. The Battle of 
Freedom also addresses teachers, lauding them as “the armor of the motherland” and 
encouraging them to “continue, and strengthen, and increase in steadfastness”.88 The ultimate 
purpose of both the student and the teacher is the strengthening and shaping of the watan - 
fatherland - within the bounds of the defining framework of the ruling regime.  
 Education became increasingly characterized by ritualized appreciations of the 
revolutionary program. One book published by the Ministry of Childrearing and Education in 
1960 titled School Songs for Middle School typifies the educational philosophy of the 
revolutionary government.89 The book’s introduction presents the Ministry’s goals for the 
songbook: “Students are prone by nature towards chanting and singing.... We can take advantage 
of this tendency in their training and education...and push them towards political movement and 
activity”.90 Every aspect of education was utilized to encourage a revolutionary mindset. The 
songs included in this book were purposed to “affect nationalistic excitement and clarify the 
landmarks of Arab Nationalism, or glorify working with one’s hands,... or connect with the 
important events that have happened in politics or economics.”91 The songs are varied; some 
religious anthems, others celebrations of Arab unity and patriotism. Bearing titles like “Arab 
Unity”, “My Brother in Algeria”, “My Principles”, “Army and Revolution”, and “Armament”, 
these songs are expressions of political and moral allegiance. 
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Image 1. School Songs for Middle School, 1960 
 These school songs were also intended to demonstrate the formal Arabic language, called 
al-lugha al-fasiha. They are described as “a tool to draw students to the formal standard Arabic 
and make accessible its flow on the tongues of students”.92 Conceptualized by Nasser as the 
language that unifies the Arab peoples, Arabic became a central focus of education during the 
revolutionary period. The renaissance of the classical arabic language was referred to as a 
“linguistic revolution” that paralleled the political one.93 The increased emphasis on both 
Modern Standard and Egyptian Arabic was informed by the emancipatory post-colonial focus of 
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Nasserism. Arab unity and anti-colonialism were two sides of the same coin, both enforced by 
the study of the Arabic language. 
The 1952 government was left relatively unchallenged in its attempts at ideology 
enforcement through the classroom. However, a few critics of the regime spoke out concerning 
the state takeover of the Egyptian classroom. Tawfiq Al-Hakim, author and playwright, wrote 
The Return of Consciousness, a scathing critique of Nasser and the 1952 revolution. In it he 
spoke against the regime’s interference in the classroom, describing how “schoolbooks in the 
hands of the young so enormously inflate the glories of the revolution that one sniffs the aroma 
of falsification and flattery, and the very same books leave bright pages from the history of other 
eras in the shadow of the unconscious.”94 History had been politicized in favor of the ruling 
regime. Louis Awad notes the ahistorical nature of post-revolution textbooks: “history books in 
our schools are no more books of history. They are rather books of pure politics… The young 
Egyptians have lost their sense of history and, consequently, their sense of politics.”95  
As Egypt’s history was being rewritten, so was its political landscape. The few 
intellectuals who spoke out against government intervention in the classroom were removed 
from their university posts.96 The revolutionary government interfered significantly within 
Egyptian higher education system. The implications of this interference do not fall within the 
scope of this paper. It is, however, important to note the extent to which free, liberal thought was 
silenced by the Free Officers regime. The liberal Egyptian intelligentsia wilted in the period 
following the Free Officers’ Revolution.97 In the 1965 analysis of the state of Egyptian education 
in the Social Science Research Council’s Education and Political Development, it is noted that 
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“what [intellectuals] suffer from is not exclusion from power, but censorship and the heavy-
handed tendency of the regime to regard all intellectual activity as simply another resource to 
mobilize.”98 The intellectuals that remained after the regime’s purge were loyal to Nasser, not 
daring to critique developments in Egyptian education. Education was no longer an academic 
pursuit — it had become a means to the end of political loyalty and homogenization. 
Nasser, in his public political speeches, emphasized the role of the teacher as statebuilder, 
designating the school as Egypt’s “origin of strength,”. According to Nasser, the school was not 
established “merely for education”, but to achieve the “goals of the revolution”. A speech given 
at the opening of a new school in 1954 designates it as “the first building of the educational 
revolution”.99 The Egyptian schoolhouse was to be the origin of a social transformation, a project 
that “mobilizes every individual to achieving his dreams” by “building the collective and not the 
individual”.100 The Egyptian classroom had been transformed into a social laboratory that was 
producing supporters of the revolutionary agenda.  
Student testimony demonstrates the effectiveness of this transformation. Mahmoud 
Faksh, an Egyptian secondary school student during the 1952 Revolution, recalls:  
“It would be safe to assume that the ceaseless efforts to bring about 
identification with the regime have been somewhat successful. My classmates and I 
developed a strong sense of identification and pride with Arabism, anti-colonialism, 
and a nationalist leader of Nasser’s caliber. On different occasions, as the government 
deemed necessary, we were able to express these feelings and attitudes by 
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demonstrating in support of regime causes and against anti-regime causes, domestic 
or foreign.”101  
The regime’s intervention in the classroom truly affected the worldview of Egypt’s students.  
As Nasser’s plans for Egypt took shape, the regime’s plan for the educational system was 
not limited to the domestic sphere. The Middle East Institute’s report on Education and Science 
in the Arab World claimed that “whatever happens in Egypt in the field of education affects the 
entire Arab world”.102 As Egypt established its role as regional leader, the goals of the revolution 
began to rapidly spread throughout the Arab world. A contemporary report observed that the 
United Arab Republic (UAR) had “stepped forward to assume its role in leading the 
development of life in the other Arab countries as well as in African and many Asian countries”,  
leading to its “undertaking many responsibilities, the most important of which is spreading 
education in the countries that are in need of it.”103 By mobilizing the individual with his 
worldview, Nasser was preparing the country of Egypt for impact on the world stage. As the next 
chapter will display, the Egyptian classroom expanded throughout the Arab world, spreading 
Nasserism throughout the Arab circle and shaping the formation of the surrounding modern 
Middle Eastern regimes. The telos of the revolutionary philosophy was expansionist, and the 
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Chapter Two: Exporting the Egyptian Revolution 
“We have recently had a very unpleasant experience of the 
intervention in politics by these [Egyptian] teachers and there is no doubt 
that they have an influence harmful not only to us but to local Rulers and 
ancient Arab traditions.”104 - Bernard Burrows, British Political Resident 
in Bahrain 
 
 In the period following the July 23, 1952 Revolution in Egypt, an ideology of state 
planning was on the rise. Arab Socialism was enforced as part of President Nasser’s plan for a 
new Egypt — the new regime initiated mass nationalization projects, expelled foreign-owned 
companies, and introduced stringent land reforms. State control was similarly exercised over the 
determination of citizens’ career paths. Job quotas were written, teacher institutes were opened, 
and rapid development became the ultimate goal. With the numerical growth of enrolled 
students, teachers were in high demand within Egypt’s borders. Despite this, increasing amounts 
of Egyptian teachers were being seconded to a variety of countries, from Eritrea to the Trucial 
States.105  
The demand for Egyptian teacher secondment should be partially attributed to the 
superiority of Egypt’s modern education system. A 1976 Al-Ahram article commented: “It is no 
coincidence that Egypt should outpace its brethren Arab states in civilization, for when 
Muhammad Ali embarked on the building of the modern state in Egypt and sent out academic 
missions to Europe, the Middle East had not yet awakened from their slumber.”106 Like this 
columnist, many Egyptian academics, historians, and teachers of his generation were 
characterized by a sense of educational superiority. Egypt did boast a significant educational 
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establishment with a long history (in comparison to its Middle Eastern counterparts). From the 
perspective of the Free Officers regime, Egypt’s academic establishment was destined to bring 
the lagging Arab states into its greatness. British Residency reports from the Gulf region agreed 
that “Egyptians, whatever their politics, are at least qualified to teach.”107 
Nevertheless, the noteworthy growth of teacher emigration after the 1952 revolution 
points to more than just external demand. In 1952, 998 Egyptian teachers were seconded 
throughout the Arab world. By 1960, this number had tripled to 3,008, and the next year it had 
grown to 3,520.108 The rapid increase in emigration cases was exclusive to teachers. Teachers, 
specifically, were being exported by the state. What was the impetus behind this radical 
expansion of teacher secondment? Was there more to Egypt’s influence on the region than its 
uncontested educational superiority? To what extent was this exportation of teachers a vessel for 
the spread of the government’s political-ideological agenda?  This chapter will argue that, more 
than simply distributing resources, the revolutionary Egyptian government promoted a Nasserist, 
Pan-Arab ideological bent through its teacher emigration programs. Sparked by a revolutionary 
internationalist impetus, teachers were sent forth to proclaim the message of anti-colonial, Arab-
centric deliverance. This message spread in the small desert towns of the Eastern Arabian 
Peninsula.  
Of course, attempts had been made in the realm of education before the 1952 revolution 
to promote Egyptian culture in both the eastern and western Arab world, characterized by 
Nahdawi aspirations.109 However, I will argue that Egypt’s government educational secondment 
programs took on a fuller political purpose after the revolution.  
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 The historical record of the Eastern Gulf at this time lacks clear documentation of mid 
twentieth century political activity.110 Historians must work mainly with competing narratives — 
the Pan-Arab perspective versus that of the British protectorate. Both of these narratives confirm 
that the spread of Nasserist ideology by way of the classroom was a central feature of mid-
twentieth century Egyptian foreign policy. In the Arabian Gulf, — the last stronghold of British 
imperialism in the Middle East — Egypt’s combination of Pan-Arab ideology and expansionist 
etatism was deeply effective. The migration of Egyptian workers throughout the Arab region 
legitimized Egypt’s newly established regime. 
The expansionist element of Egypt’s foreign policy was not defined immediately after the 
Free Officers Revolution. Rather, there occured a “shift in revolutionary action from the 
domestic to the international stage [that] was accompanied by a parallel redirection of 
ideological development whereby Egyptian nationalism evolved into Pan-Arabism.”111 Pan-
Arabism, the belief in a sovereign Arab community centered upon shared culture, language, 
history, and territory, was eventually embraced and co-opted by the Free Officers regime, 
providing a pretext for political outreach.112 Various historians have discussed the impetus 
behind this outreach, naming oil wealth, anti-Western sentiment, and even Gamal Abdel-
Nasser’s personal desire for power. Though different forms of Arab nationalism had emerged 
earlier in the twentieth century, the movement was increasingly conflated with Egyptian 
sovereignty. This chapter will look specifically at the soft-power tools used by the revolutionary 
Egyptian government to package and punctuate Nasser’s ideology for the rest of the Arab world. 
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It will focus on the mass-exportation of teachers from Egypt to the Gulf states, and evaluate the 
political implications of this educational Egyptianization.  
Arab Unification: Nasser’s Pan-Arab Aspirations 
 Throughout the fifties, Nasserist rhetoric concerning the greater Arab world was 
evolving. Egypt’s responsibility to the surrounding “Arab nation” became a central feature of the 
political agenda starting in 1954 and increasing throughout the decade.113 Nasser began to use 
the term qawmiyya ‘arabiyya, Arab nationalism, frequently in public speeches beginning in 
1956.114 This timeline is supported by a survey of Egyptian influence in the Arab World 
conducted by the British Foreign Office, which indicated that Egypt’s “drive to extend her 
influence in the Middle East and Africa” had not begun in earnest until 1954.115 The concept of 
the umma, a united Arab nation which featured frequently in Nasser’s later speeches, was taking 
shape in the years after the 1952 revolution.  
When Pan-Arabism began to loom larger on the Egyptian agenda, a shift in rhetoric 
occured. Jack Jankowski emphasizes the phrases eventually used in Nasser’s speeches to 
“illustrate the practical reasons for Arab nationalism and unity”: “protective armor,” a “weapon 
employed against aggression”, and the fulfillment of “common interests”.116 Egypt was in the 
position to protect and advocate for its fellow Arab nations, and uniting under the same banner 
would guarantee that protection.  
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 Pan-Arab ideology did not begin with Egypt, nor did it begin with the revolution. Its first 
manifestation hails from the Arab conferences in 1931, 1937, and 1938, situated in Jerusalem, 
Bloudan, and Cairo, respectively. And though Cairo had long since emerged as a central player 
in this Arab nation, Egypt was by no means the unquestioned leader. In 1942, Egypt took further 
steps to “identify herself with the Arab movement” which culminated in the formation of the 
Arab League in 1946.117 
The ideology of Pan-Arabism “frequently was all things to all men”, appearing in the 
early twentieth-century Levant, the era of Arab Revolt in the Hejaz, and the later rise of 
Ba’athism in Syria and Iraq.118 Though Nasser was not the prime mover of Pan-Arabism, he 
rebranded it and lent it a popular force. Pan-Arabism, which became undoubtedly “the most 
dynamic political force in the area” was given a distinctly Egyptian flavor throughout the Arab 
world in the late fifties, eventually reaching the Gulf and resonating with local movements 
toward independence.119 ALESCO, the Arab League Educational, Cultural and Scientific 
Organization, was effectively another tool in Egypt’s toolbox. As one Western contemporary 
observed, “Egypt takes an active part in this vast network of cultural exchange, her professors 
and education experts making valuable contributions. ... the possible trend is that Egypt will 
become increasingly involved with [ALESCO], which is in harmony with so many of her 
declared aspirations and policies.”120 
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Several other Arab political institutions were centered upon Egypt’s leadership. The Arab 
League, the Association of Arab Graduates, and many similar organizations were “ostensibly 
Pan-Arab but in reality Egyptian-inspired and Egyptian-dominated.”121 Arab League 
headquarters were located in Cairo and its Secretary General was an Egyptian.122 Much has been 
written on Egyptian predominance in the Arab League, displaying the near-unquestioned 
authority of Egypt’s post-revolution regime.123 Indeed, Arab League offices opened in the Gulf 
region in the mid-fifties, parallel to the Egyptian state’s increased interest in that region.124  
The formation of the United Arab Republic (UAR) in 1958 incarnated Nasser’s 
philosophy of Pan-Arabism. This new state united Egypt and Syria, achieving a great victory for 
Nasser: “Today Arab nationalism is not just a matter of slogans and shouts; it has become an 
actual reality”.125 The ultimate goal was a united Arab front, with Egypt in its rightful place as 
leader. The Arab world was promised protection in uniting, Nasser claiming that “it is not 
possible to assure [the Arabs’] security save if united with all of their brothers in Arabism in a 
strong cohesive unity”.126 Nasser’s revolutionary message claimed the allegiance of every Arab 
and resonated deeply with disenchanted citizens throughout the Middle East.  
Though the American security apparatus had less suspicion of the UAR than did the 
British, both governments were aware of the shifting power balances in the Middle East. In the 
midst of ongoing Cold War proxy conflicts, Egypt was being watched carefully. In the Gulf, 
“Egyptian influence...was greatest in the less developed countries of the Arabian Peninsula, 
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where Egypt was the preeminent external influence in the mid-1900s.”127 Playing on the popular 
resentment of British colonial presence, Nasserism was taking hold. The influence of The Voice 
of the Arabs, a radio station broadcast across the Arab world, was deemed a legitimate 
destabilizing force in the Gulf. Speeches from Cairo, which were “beaming throughout the Arab 
world through the Egyptian propaganda machines, had considerable impact… on the man in the 
street.”128 Every Arab was aware of Nasser’s growing role on the world stage. Adeed Dawisha 
demonstrates the linking of the Arab nationalist creed “in the minds of the Arab people to the 
person of Gamal Abdel Nasser.”129 Owing to the charisma of Egypt’s president, this slogan was 
increasingly used: al-Umma al-‘Arabiya min al-Muhit al-Atlasi ila al-Khalij al-‘Arabi – the Arab 
nation from the Atlantic Ocean to the Arabian Gulf.130 The eastern edges of the Arab world were 
included in the unified fervor that possessed the region. 
Egyptian sources portray a familial posture towards Arab countries. Playing the role of 
al-shaqiqa al-kubra131 — the older sister — the Egyptian state had the best interest of its siblings 
in mind. According to the Egyptian narrative, Nasser was destined to lead his fellow Arabs out 
from darkness and confusion. At this moment, “the Arab world yearned for development and 
Nasser yearned for regional leadership,” providing a perfect platform for Egypt’s regional 
emigration policy. Gradually, this policy “became a central component of realising Egyptian 
leaders’ aspiration to become primus inter pares within the Arab world”.132  
 
127 Ibid., 56. 
128 Hasan, The Struggle, 28. 
129 Adeed Daweesha, Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: From Triumph to Despair (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2003), 123. 
130 Ibid. 
131 Gerasimos Tsourapas, “Nasser’s Educators and Agitators across al-Watan al-‘Arabi: Tracing the Foreign Policy 
Importance of Egyptian Regional Migration, 1952-1967,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 43, no. 3 
(2016): 327. 
132 Ibid., 328. 
 37 
The unification of the Arab world was about far more than sisterhood among nations — 
“Egypt’s hegemonic aspirations were disguised by, and sometimes confused with, the promotion 
of revolutionary ideals.”133 Egyptian expansionism was on the rise, perfectly justified by the 
resounding message of Pan-Arabism. At the inauguration of The Voice of the Arabs, Cairo’s 
wide-ranging radio station, Free Officer Mohammed Naguib commented: “We are as greatly 
concerned with Arab questions as we are with our own.”134 Of course, Arab questions were often 
met with an Egyptian solution.135 Questions arose: is this movement genuinely about Arab 
emancipation, or is it concerned with Egyptian domination? What is motivating the Egyptian 
government’s interference in the everyday lives of Arabs throughout the region?  
British correspondent Elizabeth Monroe addresses these questions in a private memo that 
designates The Voice of the Arabs as “the Egyptian propaganda machine, speaking in the name 
of ‘Arabism’, calls incessantly for Arab unity against the West, and provides a platform for 
Arabs of all nationalities who are opposed to European influence in the Middle East.” She 
criticizes this rhetoric as “Egyptian-inspired and Egyptian-dominated.”136  
By admission of Nasser himself, the Egyptian state agenda was not solely driven by 
friendliness towards fellow Arab states. Nasser claimed that, for Egypt, “The part to be played is, 
first of all, that of a ‘liberator’”.137 Egypt was the self-proclaimed leader in the emancipation of 
the colonized world, both the smaller Arab circle and the larger third world. Nasser explained 
that, because “every Arab-speaking country is our country”, it must be liberated, “whether 
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willingly or perforce”.138 Whether or not the Arab world desired it, Egypt claimed a 
responsibility to project its influence. The Nasserist state was developing an ideology of 
Egyptian expansion under which liberation was synonymous with Egyptian takeover.  
President Nasser used Pan-Arabism as “a counteridentity, a “shield” against Western 
imperialism, a symbol of independence, a means to achieve Egypt’s hegemony over the Arab 
world, and perhaps an economic opportunity to transfer some of the huge oil revenues of the 
Gulf states to the benefit of the Egyptian people.”139 All kinds of state objectives were fulfilled 
by the adoption of this ideology. During the height of Nasser’s power, British correspondent 
Elizabeth Monroe observed: “President Nasser… remarked that a solution [to Egypt’s 
predicament was] ...control over some major source of energy.”140 The “unification of the Arab 
nation from the Ocean to the Gulf” would fulfil that objective. Oil revenue was an appealing 
possible result of Arab unification. Nasser was using Pan-Arabism as a tool to consolidate and 
replace power structures throughout the Arab world. Egypt’s Pan-Arabism was replacing one 
colonizing power with another. 
It is commonly represented that the Nasser-era exportation of Egyptian teachers to the 
Gulf “was an important gesture of solidarity promoting pan-Arabism, and a sign that Egypt 
remained the cultural centre of the Arab world.”141 But the sheer expansionist nature of mid-
twentieth century Egyptian statecraft is often overlooked. Kuwaiti scholar Talal Al-Rashoud has 
uncovered the political “indoctrination in the classroom” that took place in the Gulf’s schools 
during the heyday of Egyptian Pan-Arab activity. He writes that Egyptian expatriate teachers 
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were “active in disseminating Nasserist ideology in the schools”.142 Education was meant for 
much more than simply reaching Egyptian citizens. It was meant to cement Nasser’s plan for the 
uniting of the Arab world. Egypt was quickly becoming schoolmaster of the greater Arab nation.  
 Though the Gulf is a wide region, its countries may be studied together because of 
similarity in culture, development, timeline, and political formation. Throughout the Gulf, 
“education had become a race with time, and it had a nationalistic motivation.”143 President 
Nasser, pursuing a more active diplomatic relationship with the Gulf states in the late fifties, took 
advantage of the region’s budding desire for education to advance elements of his political 
agenda among the Arab nation.  
The UAR-Gulf Political Relationship 
 According to British assessment, the United Arab Republic’s foreign policy sought to 
“achieve its objectives through cultural and educational means”.144 
President Abdel Nasser’s frequent meetings with leaders of the Gulf states dealt, in part, 
with the sending of ba’athat — delegations — of teachers from Egypt to various schools in the 
far Eastern Arab world.145 These ba’athat were symbols of cooperation between Egypt and its 
sisters in the Gulf — useful to the goals of both nations. Alongside the provision of teachers, the 
Egyptian Cultural Mission to the Gulf was established, promoting Egyptian music, films, 
literature, and newspapers in an effort to increase Egyptian influence amongst Gulf Arab 
youth.146 In an atmosphere of Arab nationalism and anti-Westernism, the rulers of the Arab Gulf, 
 
142 Al-Rashoud, “Modern Education and Arab Nationalism in Kuwait,” 304. 
143 Muhammad Morsy Abdallah, The United Arab Emirates: A Modern History (London: Croon Helm, 1978), 143. 
144 “US policy in Persian Gulf”, November 29, 1962, The National Archives, FO 371/162783, 131. 
145 Arif al-Sheikh, Tariikh al-Ta’liim fiy Dubayy (Dubai: UAE Ministry of Information and Culture, 2004), 301. 
146 Onley, Britain and the Gulf Shaikhdoms, 17. 
 40 
were seeking support. This desire for involvement meant that Egypt’s agenda for unification, 
development, and education could move forward.  
Image 2. The Sheikh Rashid bin Sa’iid (second Prime Minister of the UAE) with his son Sheikh 
Maktoum bin Rashid visiting President Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1959. 
 
Several of the Gulf Arab sheikhs and leaders were influenced by the amiability of Egypt. 
Only three years after Egypt’s revolution, Sharjah’s Sheikh Saqar bin Sultan al Qasimi asked 
President Nasser to send an educational delegation to his emirate.147 The first Egyptian 
educational delegation to Sharjah was made up of two people, but it soon grew, other delegations 
taking root throughout the Emirates. Emirati historian Arif Al-Sheikh recorded: “the speeches of 
the great leader Gamal Abdel Nasser and and his repeated appeals found acceptance with the 
people of the Gulf and the Emirates, and particularly the Sheikh Saqr bin Sultan, who was 
influenced by Arab nationalism more than other leaders in the region.”148 These delegations 
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generated immediate political fervor, their arrival remembered as an “uproarious [Arab] 
nationalist tide from Egypt”.149 
After Sharjah’s reception of the first delegation of Egyptian teachers, the Emirate 
organized a state visit with President Abdel Nasser. During the visit in 1957, Prince Khalid bin 
Sultan al-Qassimi, brother of the ruler of Sharjah, reaffirmed his “love and the love of the entire 
people of Sharjah for Egypt and her President, who have restored to the Arabs their dignity.” The 
Prince praised Nasser: “No wonder that President Abd al-Nasir is the leader who has lit the torch 
of nationalism in Asia and Africa. We shall never forget Egypt, which stands today and will 
continue to stand forever for our defence."150 Nasser was seen as a liberator, protector, and an 
inspiration. Thus, the state of Egypt was an example to follow in the Gulf’s progression towards 
nationalism and decolonization. The rhetoric of shared destiny and mutual loyalty between Egypt 
and the Gulf had reached its height.  
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Image 3. President Gamal Abdel Nasser presents Sheikh Rashid bin Saeed Al Maktoum, 
Vice President of the United Arab Emirates and Ruler of the Emirate of Dubai, with the Order of 
the Nile, Egypt’s highest state honor. 
 
Through the fifties, the United Arab Republic was accelerating its programs of cultural 
and educational exchange, with specific focus on the Arab world. By the school year 1959-60, 
there were 14,349 foreign students studying in Egypt, 2,259 of them studying at the expense of 
the Egyptian government. Added to the loaning of thousands of teachers to a total of 20 
countries, Egypt was expending significant resources to provide education for citizens of the 
Arab, African, and Muslim spheres.151 
 
Image 4. The newspaper caption reads: “In Cairo, Wednesday, December 20, 1961, at the 
presenting of credentials of the first ambassador to the UAR from Kuwait. Depicted is Mr. ‘Abd 
al-’Aziz Hussein, ambassador to the state of Kuwait, presenting his credentials to distinguished 
President Gamal Abdel Nasser.” 
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Though not directly affiliated with Egypt, left-wing Arab nationalist political and cultural 
movements were clearly influenced by the Pan-Arab political current. Arab nationalist clubs 
emerged during the fifties, the most prominent located in Sharjah and titled al-Urubah 
(Arabism). From this club came the region’s first local, nationalist press, inspired by Egyptian 
publications.152 In Kuwait, the Teacher’s Club was reported to be full of Egyptophiles.153 Egypt 
had great influence over formal and informal political organizations throughout the Gulf region. 
And political events in Egypt made waves in the Gulf – in 1956, when Nasser nationalized the 
Suez Canal and called for the support of Arabs, the Lajnat al-Andiyya al-Kuwaitiyya (The 
Committee of Kuwaiti Clubs) convened a “popular conference” in solidarity with Egypt.154 
The shadowy Front for the Liberation of Occupied Eastern Arabia (FLOEA) also 
emerged during the fifties, an “underground teacher-led nationalist group” that seems to have 
claimed a significant number of student members.155 Many of the authorities of the National 
Front in Dubai were intimately connected with Egypt – one of its leading members, Kuwaiti Saif 
bin Hamed bin Ghurair, donated about 40,000 rupees to Nasser’s Egyptian Arms Fund.156 
National Front radio propaganda in 1956 adhered to the Pan-Arab perspective, demanding active 
opposition of imperialism in the Gulf: “Your country is part of the Arab World. Get up from 
your sleep and contact all your relatives from Dhofar to Qatar . . . Rest assured that you are not 
an ignorant country and that you belong to the progressive Arab world.” The broadcast hailed 
Nasser as a prime model of resistance, commanding listeners: “Join hands and listen to President 
Jamal Abdul Nasser who has said in the Egyptian constitution that Egypt is a part of the Arab 
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world and a progressive country.”157 Egypt was an important consideration to the political 
framework of both official Gulf state actors and underground political fronts. 
 All of this took place amid the tension of the Arab Cold War — a conflict between 
newly-established Arab republics (led and represented by Nasser of the UAR) and traditionalist 
kingdoms. The Eastern Gulf nations were caught in between, their neighbor Saudi Arabia 
emphasizing Islamic identity and national sovereignty to the exclusion of Pan-Arabism.  
The dispersion of Egyptian teachers into the Gulf region awakened the previously 
isolated inhabitants of the Gulf to the wider problems of the Arab world. Egypt itself embraced 
its self-endowed responsibility to further Arab socialism, claiming a “legitimate appeal for 
freedom, socialism, and the unity of all people of the Arab Nation.”158 Nasser’s regional policy 
included all Arabs and became deeply important to the political scene of the modernizing Gulf 
states.  
Egyptian Teacher Emigration to the Gulf 
Much of the writing on immigration and emigration patterns of mid twentieth century 
Egypt characterize the state as entirely unfocused on the movement of its population. Ali 
Dessouki writes that “it is difficult to speak in terms of a migration, or even a population policy 
in Egypt until the early sixties.”159 Much of the study of Egypt’s population movement focuses 
on the seventies, which experienced an unprecedented boom in the emigration of middle-class 
professionals.160 Though there was a “lack of a coherent and concrete set of objectives” to 
Egypt’s migration policy in the early fifties, the state’s usage of resources for teacher 
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secondment points to a set of unstated objectives.161 The emigration of teachers from Egypt to 
the surrounding Arab world was noteworthy in comparison to the emigration of other skilled 
workers. Beginning in earnest in 1954, teacher emigration preceded the mass migration of 
Egyptians to the Gulf for employment in the oil industry by several generations, incentivized by 
the Egyptian government rather than the draw of oil-rich salaries.162 
 In general, emigration of Egyptian citizens was frowned upon. The “the antagonistic 
attitude of the government towards migration” was “revealed through its imposition of many 
barriers.”163 In an increasingly controlled economy, Egyptian workers did not necessarily enjoy 
freedom to seek out international job opportunities. Egypt had a burgeoning population of 
students and a newly established policy of universal elementary education, thus teachers were in 
high demand.164 Between school years 1953/1954 and 1965/1966, primary school enrollment had 
increased by 145%. General secondary school enrollment had increased by 127%. And 
university enrollment had increased by 130%.165 Egypt was in need of teachers at every level.  
Nevertheless, the numbers point to a rapid influx of Egyptian teachers in the Gulf starting 
in the mid-sixties. Though Egypt imposed restrictions on immigration, its policy on emigration 
of workers in the education sector was an intentional exception to the rule. The scope of teacher 
secondment programs may have even had adverse effects upon Egypt’s domestic quality of 
teaching. Negative effects on local education were noticed when teacher migration increased.166 
Egypt’s revolutionary government was willing to sacrifice in order to broadcast its agenda 
throughout the wider Arab circle. The Ministry of Education’s five year plan, published in 1963, 
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anticipated sending an additional 1,500 teachers to “other Arab countries” in the year 1964-65 
alone.167 Michael Engman argues that Egypt’s willingness to “cover...the cost of their seconded 
professionals is evidence that the expected gains were more related to increases in Egypt’s 
political capital than prospective remitted savings.”168 A British correspondent reporting on the 
Gulf in the sixties deemed it noteworthy that “the Egyptian teachers who are on loan from the 
Egyptian Ministry of Education receive their salaries from the Egyptian government”.169 This 
policy provided Arab governments with a powerful incentive to staff their schools with 
Egyptians.170 Domestically, the Egyptian government needed teachers for its schools, but it 
deemed teacher secondment worth the investment — the means to a political end. But for the 
fledgeling Gulf schools, any teacher was a welcome commodity. 
Egypt’s Seconded Teachers in the News 
The Arab news sources take note of Egyptian teacher secondment to the Gulf throughout 
the fifties and sixties. An article published in al-Gomhuriya titled “Saudi Arabia to Have 1350 
Egyptian Teachers for the 1957-58” reports a significant presence of both seconded and 
independently-contracted Egyptian teachers in the Saudi kingdom. The article notes that “Egypt 
believes that it is her duty to help her sister Arab states to develop their education and learning,” 
stressing the country’s felt obligation to aid the surrounding Arab sphere. It adds that, for the 
Gulf nations, “development will not be achieved unless Egypt supplies these states with their 
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needs for teachers at any cost.”171 From the Egyptian perspective, the provision of teachers was a 
charitable, neighborly act.  
Another article in Sabah al-Khair, an Egyptian weekly publication, focuses specifically 
on Kuwait. Its author, the paper’s editor, had just returned from a trip to deliver a lecture in 
Kuwait. His article, published in 1957, depicted Kuwait as a politically active society — “Every 
political trend is represented in Kuwait. Nationalism, communism, Arabism, socialism, etc”. It 
also called for an increase in these trends, claiming that “the first necessity in the political sphere 
is to strengthen Arab nationalism in Kuwait.”172 The Egyptian government bloc was in full 
support of the spread of Pan-Arab ideology, viewing it as the key to post-colonial freedom. 
However, the geopolitical significance of Egyptian teacher secondment was not missed 
by Western journalists and politicians, who often colored “Egyptian diplomatic missions abroad” 
as “subversive activities with the object of fomenting pro-Egyptian feeling in the countries to 
which they are accredited.”173 
 British assessments tended to identify “a toxic combination of education, technology and 
foreign domination in fomenting Arab nationalism”.174 British and American news sources 
commented significantly on the emigration patterns of Egypt’s teachers.  One noteworthy article 
by British journalist Elizabeth Monroe in 1957 dubs these teachers “Egypt’s Empire Builders,” 
claiming that their influence on the Arab world was “just as potent” as that of “Egypt’s best 
known instruments of propaganda”, namely “Cairo radio and illustrated weekly magazines”.175  
She characterizes the Pan-Arab movement as a disguised Egyptian power-grab, claiming that the 
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“‘greater Arab nation’ under Egyptian management has an instrument ready in hand — the 
schoolmaster for a new school, not to mention the inspector for the school systems as a 
whole.”176 Though she admits the diversity of perspective in Egyptian emigrants, she explains 
that they are “interspersed with members of Egypt’s Cultural Mission — men and women glib 
with patter from Cairo’s Ministry of National Guidance and capable… of injecting into the 
tincture of disloyalty to the local ruler or government.” Of course, the British perspective was 
naturally antagonistic to competitors for power in the Gulf, the final stronghold of the Crown’s 
influence in the Middle East. The close of Monroe’s article calls for a “pooling of thought by 
educationists from both the independent oil countries and the West — for both have an interest in 
widening the choice of candidates for schoolmastership in the Arab world.” This scathing 
assessment of Egyptian intentions attracted the attention of foreign powers, displayed in Ms. 
Monroe’s articles and correspondences.  
The American press also took note of Egyptian trends in the Arab world. Foreign 
correspondent Sam P. Brewer wrote that “Kuwait is heavily infiltrated with Egyptian influence”, 
and that this “influence is strong among the younger elements of the population”. Brewer 
concluded that British involvement in Kuwait is agreeable to both parties, and characterized 
Egypt as one of the “less endowed countries that covet [Kuwait’s] wealth.”177According to 
American and British sources, Egyptian teachers were being sent with an overt political agenda. 
Many memoirs and personal records from the mid-nineteenth century Gulf region note the 
volume and intensity of political activity conducted by seconded government employees.  
Missionaries of the UAR: Egypt’s Teachers in the Gulf 
 
176 Ibid. 
177 Sam Pope Brewer, "Cairo Propaganda Stirs Kuwait, but State's British Tie is Strong: Oil-Rich Sheikhdom's 
People Oppose Sharing of Wealth Despite Arab Sympathies Many Egyptian Teachers," New York Times, March 15, 
1957, 4. 
 49 
The Egyptian state program of teacher secondment was central to spreading the Free 
Officers’ revolution. Titled nizam al-ia’ara lil-kharij, or intidab al-mudarrisiin, this program 
was an intentional effort to establish the values of the regime throughout the Arab world. 
Government documents promoting Egypt’s plan for education remark that “since the blessed 
revolution began on July 23, 1952,” the Egyptian regime has sought to “provide the opportunity 
for every Arab citizen to know his potential and build up his nation,” because “unity of thought 
is the way to Arab unity.”178 These seconded Egyptian teachers had undergone “courses of 
environmental service, the study of Arabic society, socialism and the 1952 Revolution and 
camps in the teachers colleges.”179 They had also participated in “special programs for teachers 
delegated to teach in other Arab, African, and Asian countries.”180  
Every seconded teacher was thoroughly vetted by Egyptian authorities, required to obtain 
an exit visa with a three-year expatriate period. They all signed contracts, promising loyalty to 
the Egyptian government and the intention not to “undermine the development goals of Egypt”. 
181 Though these teachers went abroad to serve the government of a different Arab country, the 
Egyptian government expected full loyalty to its regime and demanded the contribution of 
expatriates to its national development goals. It was suspected by the British that “when these 
teachers take up their appointments abroad, they are expected to remain under the control of the 
local Egyptian representative.”182 Sources from Sharjah confirm that, “Egypt paid the salaries of 
her teachers”, and “all of the members of the [Egyptian] educational delegation’s salaries and 
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travel tickets were funded by Egypt at that time.” This practice continued throughout the fifties 
as a steady partnership.183 
The Egyptian system of teacher secondment was frowned upon by the British, who 
lamented “the same bad old system of being seconded and paid by the Egyptian Government, to 
whom they [seconded teachers] would alone be responsible.”184 Under the Free Officer 
government’s secondment system, teachers were ideologically vetted and trained, tested for 
loyalty to the regime, and kept dependent on it throughout their time abroad.  Though not all 
Egyptian teachers were staunch supporters of Nasser (some were affiliated with the Muslim 
Brotherhood, others simply not politically involved), a great number were promoting his 
ideology of Arab unity.185 One Egyptian headmaster was expelled for making an inflammatory 
pro-Nasser speech at a political rally in Bahrain.186 Egyptian teachers were incentivized to send 
students to Egypt and encouraged to promote the regime’s ideology in the classroom. Elizabeth 
Monroe wrote: “As well as supplying sister Arab countries with teachers, Egypt encourages them 
to send students to Cairo, where these feelings of militant pan-Arabism are developed.”187  
 In some cases, these Egyptian teachers in the Gulf were suspected of conducting covert 
political activity on behalf of the Egyptian government. One Emirati recalls that the Egyptian 
Educational Mission in Dubai was suspected of coordinating espionage, possibly infiltrated by 
intelligence officers who actively incited political demonstrations.188 Throughout the fifties and 
sixties, Egyptian clubs were established by Egyptian embassies throughout the Gulf, which 
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maintained Nasserist political activity.189  The Egyptian Cultural Mission to the Gulf was 
mounting – in 1956 the Mission had no one in Qatar, by the next year it had six. In 1956 the 
Mission had 290 in Kuwait, by 1957 there were 400.190 The Gulf was being flooded by Egyptian 
cultural and educational influence.  
Egypt’s financial provision for its seconded teachers was overtly politicized – they were 
offered bonuses by the Egyptian government which rewarded the teaching of pro-Nasser content. 
A UAR document details the allocation of “prizes for a total of five thousand pounds to 
stimulate… teachers to address these national issues, and to add new ideas to be considered, and 
to open areas for research and analysis so that the concepts of the new society may deepen in the 
hearts of young men, among the sons of the Arab nation.”191  
 A publication of the UAR’s Ministry of Higher Education titled Higher Education in 12 
Years, published on the 23rd of July, 1964, details the sending of teachers as emisarries – 
muba’athiin. One section titled “The Competition of the Emissaries” describes the participation 
of children of Egyptian emigrants in a game-show competition in which they answered questions 
connected with Arab nationalism “to link them with their beloved homeland and the 
developments taking place in it.”192 This book also details the UAR’s provision of knowledge 
about both Egyptian and Arab matters to students around the Arab world, incentivizing “the 
provision of references on national issues to young people” by holding a “competition to write 
books for university and institute students on: The July 23 Revolution, Arab nationalism, and 
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Arab socialism.”193 Teachers were encouraged to spread the values of the Egyptian revolution in 
addition to Pan-Arab ideology.  
 Egyptian politics featured openly inside the classroom, some schools in Dubai even 
displaying pictures of President Nasser on their walls.194 One class was trained to salute the 
picture, shouting “Down with colonisation and long live Jamal!”195  
Much of the curricular material taught in Gulf schools was Egypt-centric. Nasserist 
influence was widespread, seeping into higher levels of educational departments in Gulf 
governments. Isma’il Al-Qabbani, the most influential Egyptian post-revolution educational 
theorist, traveled around the Gulf with other Egyptian education specialists to provide training 
and suggest curriculum. His speech was “saturated” with “Arab nationalist ideology”, pointing to 
the conflation of Arab and Egyptian nationalism that was present in educational materials 
starting in the late fifties.196 In his comprehensive educational recommendation report written for 
Kuwait, Al-Qabbani recommended an emphasis on “reading and the Arabic language”, “history 
books”, “geography”, and “nationalistic childrearing”.197 Each of these categories encourage a 
significant focus on the shared heritage of the Arab world, promoting a Pan-Arab approach 
through the curricula. This Pan-Arab approach was, of course, tinged with Egyptian territorial 
nationalism.198  
This Egyptian influence on Gulf schools’ curricula did meet some opposition. Kuwaiti 
Nationalist Darwish Al-Miqdadi criticized the Egyptianization of curricula, explaining that 
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“students must be taught about Arab society in general, and Egyptian society specifically on the 
basis that it is part of Arab society.”199 Al-Miqdadi also opposed the appointment of Egyptian 
teachers, claiming that “such people as the Egyptian government would send… would not be 
good men.”200 However, the Egyptian curriculum was, in the end, maintained in Kuwait’s 
schools.201 Kuwaiti Director of Education, Abdul Aziz Hussein, was known to have been 
influenced by Egypt’s ideology. British records explain that “he [Hussein] and the whole 
education department have been very seriously affected by the Suez incident and continue to be 
almost wholly subject to Egyptian influence”.202  
Describing the beginnings of formal education in the Gulf, Sheikha Al-Misnad wrote: 
“the school curricula in the Gulf States” were “initially based on the Egyptian system of 
education”.203 Egyptian textbooks were considered the best of those produced in the Arab world. 
Egypt’s educational system was the standard – Egypt’s standardized test, the Tawjihiyya, was 
widely used throughout the Gulf. Students who passed it graduated with an Egyptian 
certificate.204  
This overt political activity did not go unopposed. The Saudi Arabian monarchy 
perceived Nasser’s extended hand in the Gulf as an attempt to grab at the region’s energy sources 
and topple the existing power balance. Indeed, Nasserist Egypt “constituted a direct threat to the 
ruling systems in the Gulf”.205 Saudi’s regime openly opposed Nasser, receiving in turn his 
moralistic condemnation. In 1962, he denounced the Saudi and Jordanian monarchies: “the shoe 
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of every Egyptian soldier is more honorable than the crown of King Saud and King Hussein”.206 
Exerting powerful influence over the smaller Gulf countries, Saudi Arabia’s regime stood as a 
counterweight to Nasser’s Arab nationalism, opposing the UAR’s efforts from Yemen to Kuwait.  
Alternative political interests from outside the Gulf similarly opposed the primacy of 
Nasserism in the region. Palestinian and Jordanian teachers had begun emigrating to the Gulf in 
the late forties, carrying their own political agendas distinct from Egypt’s brand of Arab 
nationalism.207 However, despite the disapproval of various Gulf governments and the lack of 
political homogeneity among teaching staff, Egyptian teachers undoubtedly made an impact. The 
younger Gulf states’ “manpower needs...buttressed the position of Nasser’s Egypt as supplier of 
highly trained, albeit deeply politicised, professionals”.208 Starting in the fifties and continuing 
throughout the sixties, overwhelming numbers of Egyptian teachers rendered the Nasserist 
agenda the most powerful voice in the schools of the Eastern Gulf.  
Political Culture in Gulf Schools 
 The politicizing activity of Egyptian teachers fanned the flames of Arab nationalist 
fervor, igniting students’ opposition to British occupation. Emirati Easa Al-Gurg recalls that the 
British “readiness to intervene, in pursuit of their own ends, in the management of our society… 
was greatly resented.”209 The popular resentment of British intervention paved the way for an 
escalation of Egyptian-tinged Arab nationalism, which was spread, in large part, by way of the 
classroom.  
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Little is written about the political atmosphere in the early modern Gulf states, and less is 
written about the political activity within its schools. These questions are most clearly addressed 
in memoirs, many of which are published by the United Arab Emirates’ National Archives. One 
of these memoirs, titled Tatawwur al-Ta’liim, gives the firsthand account of a teacher in Kuwait. 
This teacher commemorates the lively atmosphere in one of Kuwait’s first schools, the 
Qasimiyya school. He recalls: “The Qasimiyya School was not merely a school – it was a social, 
religious, political, and cultural center. Students did not graduate from this center having 
acquired mere information, rather they graduated… saturated with the spirit of wataniyya 
(nationalism) and qawmiyya (Pan-Arabism), and became thereafter outstanding leaders in many 
fields.”210 These fledgeling schools are remembered as centers of political activity, instilling 
Arab nationalism and Pan-Arabism.  
These ideologies, in the minds of students in the Gulf, were directly connected with 
Egypt. In the year 1956/57, “students, defending nationalist and Pan-Arab sentiment, provoked 
... English officers,watched them pass by the school in their cars, and threw rocks at them, 
yelling: “Long live Gamal Abdel Nasser! May [British Prime Minister] Eden fall!”211 Support 
for Egypt, and Pan-Arab sentiment, was perceived by students as a direct affront on British 
occupying forces. Political protests against “the presence of the British colonizer” were directly 
connected with support for the “overwhelming nationalist tide and for Nasserism.”212 Egypt was 
inspiring Arab patriotism and bolstering anti-western sentiment. Of course, every instance of 
student-led political fervor in the Gulf cannot be directly attributed to the activism of Egyptian 
teachers, but the protests were overwhelmingly inspired by Egyptian politics.  
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Similarly, in Dubai there occurred “numerous examples” of Egyptian teachers “inciting 
students and raising their awareness of Nasserism”.213 As several delegations of Egyptian 
teachers arrived in the Trucial States, Nasser’s “militant Arab nationalism” spilled over, 
producing “strong reactions” to Arab victories like the nationalization of the Suez canal in 
1956.214 Even “young students in the schools of the Trucial States demonstrated, expressing their 
sympathy with Egypt in her fight against the Israeli invasion and British and French 
collaboration”.215  
 United States Department of State correspondence details similar demonstrations in 
Kuwait, in which “less orderly groups varying in size from 50 to 300 sometimes comprised 
school children (presumably marching to or from school)”.216 It was suspected that these 
demonstrations were encouraged by both rising political temperatures throughout the Arab world 
and the specific encouragement of Egyptian teachers. Within Kuwaiti classrooms, “bellicose 
Nasserist rhetoric” had come to dominate textbooks, classroom instruction, and extracurricular 
activities.217 Political activity quickly became overwhelming — the Kuwait government was 
“becoming concerned over continuation of these demonstrations” and was “putting blame 
squarely on the shoulders of the Egyptian Embassy, using Egyptian teachers to organize and 
encourage students and other elements to demonstrate in favor of Arab unity, Nasser, etc.”218 
Egyptians were stirring support for revolutionary ideology in Kuwait’s schools: the 
demonstrations were “sometimes comprised entirely of non-Kuwaiti Arabs carrying Arab Union 
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flags and pro-Nasser banners have taken place throughout Kuwait town”.219 This pro-Egypt 
activity was ignited by Arab immigrants to Kuwait. Egyptian teachers were “purposely trying to 
whip up public opinion” in favor of their home country and its Pan-Arab aspirations.220  
 Schools in the Gulf began to host cultural festivals, which were widely attended. The 
importance of national celebrations to post-colonial Arab identity is demonstrated by Elie Podeh, 
who explores “the creation of new cultural hybrids” related to Pan-Arabism.221 His research 
underscores the conjunction of national and Arab loyalties at these festivals, explaining how 
celebrations “strengthened… the supra-national identity” while emphasizing “heroism and 
sacrifice in each state’s historical narrative.”222 Thus, in the Arabian Peninsula, regional elements 
of Gulf culture could be celebrated while simultaneously lauding the larger Arab collective.  
Festivals were opportunities to inculcate the local society with Arab nationalist values —  
in the case of Sharjah, “the Arab flags were flown at these festivals without exception — flags of 
the Arab league beside the flag of Sharjah.”223 The political victories of the Arabs were 
celebrated. British correspondent Elizabeth Monroe recalls a performance at a “recent school 
festival… acted by small boys who would never in the normal course have heard of Sinai,” in 
which they “mimed attack on a tent adorned with Israel’s star of David, a triumphal stoning and 
burning of it by fellow-pupils dressed as Egyptians”.224 It is not hard to imagine that this 
performance was coordinated by an Egyptian teacher. By opposing colonizing presence in the 
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allegiances and emphasized the Arab aspects of collective cultural identity. Students in the Gulf 
were being swept up in the larger Arab cause.  
 
Image 5. Uprising of students at the Qasimiyya schools throughout the Suez Crisis on Egypt in 
1956.225 
 
These demonstrations continued for several years. Mohammed Diab recalls that, 
eventually, “the festival was not restricted to the specified area beside the school; rather it 
extended and morphed into a demonstration that decried the British presence and called for its 
decline, and commemorated the life of the late leader Gamal Abdel Nasser.”226 Central to the 
festivals were speeches “about Arab nationalism — Nasser’s version” that were “reminiscent of 
National Socialism and totalitarianism”.227  
Taking place in various cities, the unprecedented levels of widespread political activity 
are noted by historians as a epoch in the political history of the Gulf. These Gulf sources on mid-
 
225 Al-Harbi, Tatawwur al-Ta’liim fiy al-Emarat, 95. 
226 Ibid. 
227 Donald Hawley, The Emirates: Witness to a Metamorphosis (Norfolk: Michael Russell, 2007), 295. 
 59 
twentieth century Egyptian influence on political culture are corroborated by the British ones. In 
terms of British intelligence and policymaking, much was noted in terms of anti-Western 
sentiment and Nasserite political activity in the Gulf. One confidential British report read: “They 
[Egyptians] claim the cultural leadership of the Arab world and their main weapons are press, 
radio and education.”228 Just as Egyptian influence in the Gulf region was reaching new heights 
in the fifties, so was British. The Trucial States specifically had become the “site of expanding 
British investment” because of its “increasingly significant geostrategic location between Britain 
and the empire east of the Suez”. Political power balances were shifting in the region, and British 
authorities were concerned with preserving their presence in the Gulf.  Bernard Burrows, 
appointed British Political Resident in the Persian Gulf in 1953, predicted that it will be an “an 
uphill task” to prevent the Gulf states from “getting drawn into the net of Arab education based 
ultimately on Egypt”.229 Concerning the “Egyptian influence” in the educational establishment, 
Burrows reported to his superiors “the very unpleasant experience of the intervention in politics 
by these teachers”. He portrays them as a threat, exercising “influence harmful to not only us [the 
British] but to local rulers and ancient Arab traditions.”230  
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Image 6. A telegram containing Bernard Burrows’ observations on the political activity of 
teachers in Kuwait and the Trucial Coast.  
 
Donald Hawley, a Political Agent in the Trucial States from 1958 to 1961, also experienced the 
growing influence of Egyptian political currents in the Gulf. He recorded that the politicization 
of schools started in the early grades with “the current practice of teaching the alphabet with ‘G 
for Gamal’ in the schools.”231  
The success of Egypt’s attempts at regional influence was not uniform — Kuwait City 
and Sharjah eclipsed other Gulf cities in their national fervor. An employee of the British 
Residency in Bahrain notes that emigrant teachers in Qatar signed a “contract which includes a 
ban on participation in politics which we hope the Ruler will enforce.”232 Pan-Arabism was 
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celebrated with different degrees of fervor throughout the Eastern Gulf states. Egyptian influence 
had made its mark throughout the Gulf, albeit with varying levels of intensity.  
Violent action was occasionally taken under the banner of Arab nationalism. In 1956, 
around the time of the Suez Crisis, a group of students attempted to set fire to Sharjah’s British 
air base.233 British government correspondence also tells the account of a fire in Kuwait that was 
set by unnamed Arab nationalists. Though the details of the event were never uncovered, 
commentary on the Egyptian government’s response to the issue was significant to British 
intelligence forces. They translated the December 13th message of Cairo’s Voice of the Arabs 
region-wide radio broadcast: 
The battle (against the British imperialist aggression) continues. This 
was the meaning conveyed to the Arabs by blowing up the oil wells in 
Kuwait. Our brethren the Arabs of Kuwait wanted to bring to our ears the 
news that the battle has not ended. Remain vigilant, maintain your 
struggle, and retain your weapons. Remember always brethren, those who 
blew up the oil pipelines in Kuwait. They did so in order to sound a 
warning to you and illuminate for you the right path.234 
 
This message, advocating violent revolution against the British and heroizing the acts of 
Kuwaiti nationalists, was broadcast throughout the Arab world by Egypt’s government. British 
government intelligence notes that the “anti-British feeling...being assiduously stimulated from 
Egypt” was “evident from the participation of Kuwaiti nationalists” who were recently in Egypt. 
The Voice of the Arabs program boasted of the Kuwaitis’ determination "to enter into the battle 
side by side with Egypt.”235 This radical nationalist agenda was directly supported by Kuwait’s 
Educational Department.236 In the eyes of the British, Gulf Arabs continued “to worship at the 
shrine of Nasser”, who was playing the part of post-colonial representative of the Arabs. Thus, 
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they did not expect a return to stability in the territory.237 The Egyptian message had penetrated 
the Gulf at both the individual and the institutional levels.  
Egypt’s educators made a long-lasting political impression upon the fledgeling Gulf 
states. In Nasserism, disenfranchised citizens of the British-occupied Gulf states had found “a 
fundamental, radical ideology” that led to “the politicization of broad groups of the populace and 
the entrenchment of the resistance movements”.238 Egypt had come to represent a powerful 
ideology, which was “a powerful catalyst in the process of state formation”.239 Though the 
influence of Nasser in the Arab world slowed after the events of 1967, and ended with his death 
in 1970, Egypt’s political relationship with the Gulf — manifested through radio, newspapers, 
and education — left a permanent mark. Emirati historian Muhammad Abdallah recalls the 
fifties as a decade that saw “far-reaching change, not only in the social and cultural life, but also 
in political attitudes” of the Gulf.240 The exportation of Nasserism, by way of Egyptian teaching 
staff, left an impact on the Gulf that far outlasted the period of direct Egyptian political influence 
in the region. The influential promotion of Arab unity encouraged the establishment of a 
centralized federation. The desire for national formation became particularly strong among the 
young educated generation, whose political vision led eventually to the creation of the United 
Arab Emirates.241 
The decade of Nasserism in the Gulf left its mark on the world order of the late twentieth 
century. One British source compared post-revolutionary Egypt’s political influence in Gulf 
society to an “alien plant” that “has taken so apparently firm a root in arid soil”.242 Indeed, 
 
237 “Internal political situation in Kuwait”, 4.  
238 Al-Naqeeb, Society and State in the Gulf and Arab Peninsula, 128. 
239 Podeh and Winckler, Rethinking Nasserism, 200. 
240 Abdallah, The United Arab Emirates: A Modern History, 140. 
241 Ibid. 
242 “Internal political situation: Kuwait”, 37. 
 63 
though the Arab East and the Arab West had little in common, the post-colonial experience, 
ignited by Egypt’s revolutionary foreign policy, united the Arab world for a brief moment. 
Nasser’s brand of Pan-Arabism fanned the flames of nationalism in the Gulf, mobilizing a 






          The memoirs of Victoria College, a renowned British secondary school in Alexandra, 
recount the post-revolution removal of Queen Victoria’s portrait from the dining hall wall and its 
subsequent replacement with a picture of President Nasser. As the 1952 Revolution gained 
ideological momentum, more schools throughout the Arab world gave the lauded President a 
place of recognition on their walls. Taught the values of Pan-Arabism and Arab socialism, many 
Arab students grew up under the influence of Egypt’s exported ideology. 
         Nasserism had taken hold in Egypt and was rapidly gaining influence in larger Arab 
circles. The classroom was a prime tool in Nasser’s toolbox, expounding curriculum and 
exporting worldview that was designed to instill allegiance to the Arab cause — and to the 
Egyptian state. After the July Revolution in 1952, the newly instated regime began reshaping 
Egypt’s domestic educational system. Building schools, training teachers, rewriting curriculum, 
and increasing government education expenditure, the Free Officers’ government had set out to 
invest in Egypt’s young generations. More than just providing an education, the revolutionary 
government was enforcing a new national perspective. The student’s daily life had become 
saturated with political purpose — education had been elevated from a mere task to an important, 
even holy, duty. President Nasser’s regime was shaping every future Egyptian citizen.  
         The Egyptian state’s influence did not end there — Nasser had a wide reach, speaking 
with authority to the surrounding Arab world. In the Eastern Gulf, his message of post-colonial 
vindication and Arab unification resonated widely. This message was delivered through news 
articles, radio broadcasts, and expatriate Egyptian teachers. The school became the center of 
Arab nationalist activity in many early Gulf cities, encouraged by politically committed 
expatriate teachers.  
 65 
         In the 1952 Revolution, Egypt experienced a regime change and witnessed a radical 
transformation of government structure. More than this, the nation took on an ideology. 
Revolutionary Egypt was not a mere state — it had become a message. This message was spread 







Abdalla, Ahmed. The Student Movement and National Politics in Egypt, 1923-1973. London: Al- 
Saqi Books, 1985. 
 
Abdallah, Muhammad Morsy. The United Arab Emirates: A Modern History. London: Croon  
Helm, 1978. 
 
Abdel Ghaffar, Adel. Egyptians in Revolt: The Political Economy of Labor and Student  
Mobilizations, 1919-2011. New York: Routledge, 2017. 
 
Abdel Nasser, Huda Gamal. al-Majmu’a al-Kamila li-Khutub wa Tasrihaat al-Ra’iis Gamal  
Abdel-Nasser. Cairo: Al-Maktaba Al-Akademiyya, 2007. 
 
Abdel Nasser, Gamal. Egypt’s Liberation: The Philosophy of the Revolution. Translated by  
Dorothy Thomson. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1955. 
 
Abdel Nasser, Gamal. Kelemat al-Bakbashi Gamal Abdel Nasser fiy al-Meydan al-Was’a amam  
Madrasat Aja al-Thanawiyya bi-Damietta, 09 April 1953. Alexandria: Bibliotheca  
Alexandria Archives, 2014. 
 
Abdel Nasser, Gamal. Khatab al-ra’iis Gamal Abdel Nasser, Part Two. Cairo: Mataab’a Majlis  
al-Khidmat, 1954. 
 
Abdel Nasser, Gamal. The Philosophy of the Revolution. Translated by John Badeau. Buffalo:  
Keynes & Marshall, 1959. 
 
Abou-El-Fadl, Reem. Foreign Policy as Nation Making: Turkey and Egypt in the Cold War.  
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019. 
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